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A bstract: This paper examines patterns of popular protest in contemporary Latin America largely in
response to the region' s adoption of market reforms. The central question addressed is, why have social
protests against neoliberal reforms emerged more in some countries than in others? And second, are there
discernible patterns in the forms of social protest being undertaken? The research questions are addressed
using a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis of domestic conflict in Latin America coupled with a
qualitative comparative analysis of the patterns of protest in the member and associate member countries
of Latin America's most important trading bloc, the Common Market of the South (Mercosur; f.1991) .
The paper argues that it is the character of domestic political institutions which structures the nature,
scope, and intensity of resistance to economic reform on the part of civil society. It is suggested that new
social actors, who lack institutionalized channels of social representation, have come to the forefront of
anti-neoliberal protests. Market reforms are found to have produced a shift in the pattern of social protest
in Latin America, from institutionalized to non-institutionalized forms of social mobilization.

The imposition of neoliberal economic reforms in Latin America has fundamentally
altered the political landscape of the region. The disarticulation of traditional class-based
collective action and the crisis of the political Left in Latin America have created a void in
popular sector interest representation. A more heterogeneous and informal workforce is
said to have diminished the strength of organized labor and reduced civil society' s capacity
for collective action (see Bafio 1993; Murillo 2001; Oxhorn & Ducatenzeiler 1999;
Roberts 1996). However, a closer examination of the regional record reveals that new,
non-institutionalized forms of social mobilization against neoliberal reforms have emerged
in certain national contexts. This study employs a pooled cross-sectional time series
analysis of domestic conflict in Latin America coupled with a qualitative comparative
analysis of the patterns of protest in the member and associate member countries of Latin
America's most important trading bloc, the Common Market of the South (Mercosur;

1

f 1991). The central question addressed by the paper is, why have social protests against
neoliberal reforms emerged more in some countries than in others? And second, are there
discernible patterns in the forms of social protest being undertaken in the region today?
The paper contends that it is the character of domestic political institutions,
particularly the degree of party system institutionalization, which structures the nature,
scope, and intensity of resistance to economic reform on the part of civil society. The
central argument is that well institutionalized party systems, such as in Chile and Uruguay,
are better able to address the demands of the popular sectors through electoral and
legislative means, thereby dampening conflict. Conversely, weakly institutionalized party
systems, such as in Bolivia and Brazil, are unable to channel popular sector demands to
the state, thereby producing a situation of radical mobilization against unpopular reforms.
Political party systems which fall between the two extremes of the institutionalized and
inchoate party systems, such as in Argentina and Paraguay, tend to produce a mixed or
intermediate degree of social protest. A more nuanced account of these case studies
reveals that even within the more institutionalized party systems, the excluded or
marginalized sectors of the polity tend to be those groups which protest against market
reforms. Similarly, within the less institutionalized party systems, those groups which
have been able to establish or maintain institutional channels to express their grievances
have tended to be far less mobilizational than those whose interests remain unrepresented
within the political system.
The theoretical approach adopted by the paper is that of the new institutionalism.
This school of thought suggests that institutions are independent variables capable of
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shaping political outcomes (March & Olsen 1989; Rothstein 1996). Institutions are said
to create incentives for social actors to behave in certain ways through the way in which
they structure the rules of the game. Party systems can play an important role in
determining whether social discontent is channeled into the political system or is directed
against the legitimacy of that system. According to Mainwaring and Scully,
"[i]nstitutionalized party systems help groups express their interests while allowing
governments to govern. They select, aggregate, and help absorb social cleavages. They
channel political demands and can dampen political conflicts" (1995, 23). In the absence
of institutionalized channels of social representation, frustrated social actors must resort to
pressuring for change from outside the formal political system. This paper examines the
notion that institutionalized party systems have a dampening effect on social protest using
the case of contemporary Latin America. A new institutionalist perspective applied to the
study of popular protest in Latin America offers important insights into the constraints and
opportunities for new social actors to be incorporated into the polity.
The paper begins with a large-N statistical analysis of the factors which account
for the varying levels of social protest found in Latin America. Institutional hypotheses as
well as alternative economic explanations are tested. The second section of the paper
presents the case studies of the Mercosur member and associate member countries,
highlighting the impact of each of the countries' respective party systems on the responses
of the popular sectors to economic reform. The case studies serve to corroborate and
extend the findings of the statistical model as well as provide a more nuanced account of
the patterns of popular protest in the region. As the major player within Mercosur, and
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the most notorious case of weak party system institutionalization in the region, the case of
Brazil is examined first. The cases of Bolivia, Argentina, and Paraguay then follow to
further illustrate the patterns of social protest in inchoate and intermediate party systems.
Lastly, the cases of Chile and Uruguay are presented to demonstrate social protest
dynamics within countries with relatively well-institutionalized party systems. The paper
concludes with an assessment of the trends in the forms of social mobilization against
neoliberal reforms that are currently underway in Latin America.
Explaining Levels of Social Protest

To test the central hypothesis of the study, that levels of social protest are higher in
countries which have weakly institutionalized party systems than in those which have wellinstitutionalized party systems, event count data on general strikes, riots, and antigovernment demonstrations in Latin America were utilized. Initially, the data for the
study was drawn from the widely-used Arthur S. Banks' cross-national time-series data
archive, which contains domestic conflict data for every nation-state between the years of
1815 to 1995. 1 However, spot-checking of the data revealed there to be serious errors of
omission due in large part to the limited coverage of protest activities in Latin America in
the principal data source used in the Banks' project? An alternative event count data set
on social protest was assembled by the author based on the Information Services on Latin
America (ISLA) periodical collection. ISLA provides monthly reports on current events

Data for the Banks' domestic conflict variables are derived exclusively from the daily files of the New
York Times. The original data set on domestic conflict behavior, 1919-1966, is available from the InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research website: www.icpsr.umich.edu.
2 Errors of omission included both articles on social protest from the New York Times that did not make it
into the Banks' data set (e.g. "Argentines Stage Rally Against Army Pardons," NYT, 10 September 1989;
according to the data set there were no anti-government demonstrations in Argentina in 1989), as well as
important protest events not captured by the NYT (e.g. "Riot in Brasilia Shakes Confidence in Sarney,"
Washington Post, 29 November 1986; according to the data set there were no riots in Brazil in 1986).
I
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for all of Latin America.3 The event count data set built from the ISLA reports contains
social protest data from 1978, the start of the third wave of democracy in Latin America,
until 1995 for 18 Latin American countries (N=216). Each country enters into the data
set starting from the year of its transition to democracy (see Appendix A). Country
dummy variables were used to control for fixed unit effects.

Dependent Variables
The study uses three social protest variables to provide a robust test of the
hypothesis. The variable definitions conform to those used in the Banks' data set. The
variables include: general strikes--defined as any work stoppage of 1000 or more
industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at
national government policies or authority; riots--defined as any violent demonstration or
clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force; and anti-government

demonstrations--defined as any peaceful gathering of at least 100 people for the primary
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority. 4 The
general strikes variable ranged from a value of 0 to 8 in terms of the number of events in a
given year; the riots variable ranged from 0 to 4; and the number of anti-government
demonstrations ranged from 0 to 9. Separate models were run for each of the dependent
variables as well as a combined model based on a computed social protest variable.5

3 The ISLA reports are derived from the daily files of the Christian Science Monitor, Financial Times of
London, Journal of Commerce, Los A ngeles Times, Miami Herald, Manchester Guardian/Le Monde , New
York Times, Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal.
4 All three social protest variables include both urban and rural protest activities. For example,
aggressive, confrontational tactics in the countryside, such as illegal land occupations, were coded as
'riots' in order to capture the element of violence. Less confrontational and contentious forms of protest,
such as provincial road blocks, were coded as 'anti-government demonstrations. '
5 The social protest variable was computed by first multiplying the riots variable by two to match the 0-8
scale of the general strikes variable, collapsing the anti-government demonstrations variable from a 0-9
scale to a 0-8 scale, and then summing the three dependent variables.
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Independent Variables
The central independent variable of the study is party system institutionalization.
According to the seminal work of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) on party systems in Latin
America, a party system is said to be institutionalized when it meets the following four
criteria: stability in the rules of the game; stable party roots in society; legitimacy of parties
and of the electoral process; and strong party organizations. Party system
institutionalization was operationalized in the study by electoral volatility and party age
variables in addition to fragmentation and polarization variables.6 A wellinstitutionalized party system is characterized by low levels of electoral volatility (net
aggregate vote shifts from one election to the next); low levels of fragmentation (the vote
share of the top two parties); and older, more entrenched parties (the average age of the
major parties). A weakly institutionalized party system is characterized as being highly
volatile, fragmented, and possessing younger, newer parties. Based on the observation by
Mainwaring and Scully (1995,31) that ideological distance tends to widen as the effective
number of parties increases, greater polarization is expected in inchoate, multi-party
systems. Therefore, it is hypothesized that higher electoral volatility, greater party system
fragmentation and polarization, and younger party ages will be associated with higher
levels of social protest.

Controls
A plausible alternative explanation for the varying levels of social protest found in
the region is that differences in economic development condition the pattern of protest. In

These variables were derived from a data set generously shared by Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels
(1999). The author of the present study calculated the scores for EI Salvador and Guatemala, the two
countries missing from their data set. For further details, see Appendix B.
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other words, 'misery breeds revolt.' Moreover, scholars working within the relative
deprivation school of thought (Gurr 1970; Muller & Seligson 1987) argue that the greater
the maldistribution of land or resources, the greater the probability of mass-based political
uprisings. In order to control for these arguments, economic variables were included in
the model. A Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita variable was used to control for
level of economic development and Gini coefficients for income inequality and land

inequality were used to control for the maldistribution of resources.7 Inflation and GDP
growth variables were also included in the model to control for economic performance as
a potential explanatory variable of social protest. 8 It is hypothesized that lower levels of
GDP per capita and growth, greater levels of income and land inequality, and higher rates
of inflation will be associated with higher levels of social protest.

Results
The results of the pooled cross-sectional time series analysis offer some support
for the hypothesis that institutional arrangements condition the level of social protest in a
country as well as for the alternative economic arguments (see Table 1). Modell tests the
impact of party system institutionalization and economic factors on the level of general
strikes. Of the economic variables, the only significant predictor of general strikes was the
level of inflation, with higher inflation being associated with an increased number of
strikes. This finding suggests that formal sector workers tend to protest in response to

7 Data for the GOP per capita variable was drawn from the World Bank (2002), World Development
Indicators data base available on CD-Rom. Data for the income and land inequality measures were taken
from Wilkie (ed.) Statistical A bstract ofLatin America, 2002, Vol. 38. For details see Appendix B.
8 Data for inflation and GOP growth rates were derived from the data set developed by Roberts and
Wibbels (1999). A logged rate of inflation was used to prevent a small nwnber of cases of hyperinflation
from skewing the results.
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Table 1
Level o/Social Protest in
Latin America by Institutional and Economic Variables

Modell
(Strikes)

Model 2
(Riots)

Electoral Volatility

.02664
(.017)

-.00739
(.009)

.03144
(.019)

.04462
(.034)

Fragmentation

-.06134***
(.016)

-.00425
(.008)

-.03536*
(.018)

-0.107***
(.033)

Polarization

-.00032
(.015)

.00586
(.008)

.06246***
(.017)

.07254*
(.030)

Party Age

-.03754
(.023)

.01294
(.012)

-.03697
(.025)

-.04895
(.046)

GDP Per Capita

.00067
(.000)

.00015
(.000)

-.00020
(.000)

.00079
(.001)

GDPGrowth

-.01133
(.026)

-.01681
(.013)

-.03719
(.029)

-.07795
(.052)

Income Inequality

-1.177
(4.527)

8.273***
(2.278)

2.309
(4.985)

17.427
(9.010)

Land Inequality

-9.308
(6.867)

1.409
(3.455)

-7.662
(7.562)

-14.416
(13.669)

Inflation

0.489***
(.092)

.0446
(.046)

-.00148
(.101)

Constant

10.802
(6.406)

-6.486
(3.223)

9.648
(7.055)

7.800
(12.752)

.532
216

.153
216

.320
216

.483
216

AdjustedR2
N

Model 3
(Demonstrations)

Model 4
(Social Protest)

0.578**
(.183)

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors printed below in parentheses.
*p';;.05, **p".OI, ***p';;.OOI.

short-term fluctuations in the economy rather than in response to long-term, structural
conditions. The other significant predictor of general strikes in the model was the degree
of party system fragmentation. Interestingly, while the fragmentation variable is
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significant, it is not in the hypothesized direction. Rather, greater numbers of strikes are
associated with a less fragmented party system. This may be explained theoretically by the
notion that greater fragmentation implies a greater number of parties, which may more
effectively channel popular sector demands into the political system. A less fragmented
party system, whereby the top two parties receive the majority share of the votes, may not
adequately represent the interests of workers, thus prompting them to mobilize.
Model 2, which tests for the factors that determine the level of riots in a country,
offers a different picture. None of the institutional variables successfully predicted the
number of riots. The only significant result was for income inequality, with higher levels
of inequality being associated with a greater number of riots. This finding suggests that in
contrast to strike activity, which results from economic fluctuations, riots are the product
of deep-seated, structural inequalities. Consequently, this finding lends support to the
relative deprivationist argument that greater social inequalities increase the likelihood of
mass-based political uprisings. However, this only appears to be the case for more violent
forms of social protest, such as illegal land seizures.
Model 3 tests the determinants of the number of anti-government demonstrations
in a country. In contrast to the other models, none of the economic variables were
successful in predicting the number of anti-government demonstrations. Only the
institutional variables yielded results. The results of Model 3 indicate that there are a
greater number of demonstrations in countries which do not have effective channels of
social representation. Both the party system fragmentation and polarization variables were
significant. While the polarization variable was in the expected direction, with greater
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polarization being associated with an increased number of demonstrations, the
fragmentation variable continued to be in the reverse expected direction. As noted above,
this may be explained by the inability of the major parties to channel popular sector
demands into the political system. These findings suggest that anti-government
demonstrations serve as an alternative means of exercising voice in a political party system
that does not adequately represent the interests of more marginalized social actors.
Finally, the results of the combined model of social protest, Model 4, further
confirm that institutional as well as economic variables determine the level of social
protest within a country. Two of the institutional variables, party system fragmentation
and polarization, were significant in the combined model, as well as one of the economic
variables, the level of inflation. Although the fragmentation and polarization variables in
and of themselves are at best an indirect measure of party system institutionalization, the
results do support the notion that domestic political institutions have an important impact
on the level of social protest in a country. Perhaps most important from a theoretical
standpoint, the findings also suggest that different types of protest may have very different

causal logics,9
Patterns of Popular Protest

While the statistical analysis reveals the factors that determine the level of social
protest within a country, it does not tell us about the actors involved and the tactics they
employ. In order to fully examine the patterns of popular protest in contemporary Latin
America, we must tum to comparative case studies. I evaluate the patterns of social
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A correlation maU'ix of the dependent variables confirmed Uial sU'ikes, riots, and anti-government

demonstrations operate independently of one another, with correlations of less man .3 for each of memo
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protest within and across countries using a qualitative approach focusing on the properties
of protest. Eckstein (1980) suggests that degrees of political conflict can be differentiated
according to scope (local versus nation wide), intensity (peaceful versus militant), targets
(specific policies versus the overall economic model), and the degree of organization
(spontaneous versus well-organized). It is based on these four criteria that I will compare
the impacts of political institutions on patterns of social protest in the Mercosur member
and associate member countries (see Table 2). The case selection offers the opportunity
to examine trends in social protest across countries with considerable differences in
power, wealth, size, development, and institutional arrangements.
Table 2
Patterns ofSocial Protest Among the Mercosur Countries A cross
Categories ofParty System Institutionalization *

Level of Social Protest**

Main Social Actors

Institutionalized Party Systems
Uruguay
Chile

Low
Low

Political parties
Political parties,
Indigenous groups

Paraguay

Moderate to low

Argentina

Moderate to high

Peasant and
Indigenous groups
Provincial
unemployed

Intermediate Party Systems***

Inchoate Party Systems
Brazil

High

Bolivia

High

Workers' Party (PT),
Rural Landless
Civic groups,
Coca growers,
Peasant and
Indigenous groups

*Party system categorizations proposed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995).
**Level of social protest is based on the combined means of the number of general strikes, riots, and anti-government
demonstrations in the event count data . Low: 0-2; Moderate: 3-5; High: 6-8.
***Although Mainwaring and Scully (1995) place Argentina in the category of 'institutionalized party systems,' they
note that "Argentina is the least clear-cut case of an institutionalized party system," suggesting that it falls between the
two extremes (p.19). Similarly, although they place Paraguay in the category of 'hegemonic party systems in transition,'
they note that "Paraguay fall(s) somewhere in between the institutionalized and the inchoate party systems" (p.20).
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The Common Market of the South
On 26 March 1991, the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
signed the Treaty of Asuncion, forming the Common Market of the South (Mercosur).10
The treaty evolved out of a common commitment of the member countries to the
principles of democracy and trade liberalization. Since the customs union became
effective on 1 January 1995, Mercosur surprised skeptics as it quickly became the most
important trade grouping in Latin America (EID 1999). The process of expanding
Mercosur began in 1996 with the associate memberships of Bolivia and Chile. Mercosur
now faces the difficult task of promoting integration among member countries with
extremely uneven levels of development. The fact that a single country, Brazil, accounts
for approximately seventy percent ofMercosur's gross domestic product (GDP) raises
serious questions about the prospects for successful integration (pereira 1999, 7). As a
consequence of its disproportionate weight and the lack of any formal dispute resolution
mechanisms within Mercosur, Brazil has largely been able to control the integration
process (Cason 2000).
Critics of Merco sur have suggested that the Treaty of Asuncion is more notable
for its silences on social issues than for what is actually stated in its text (Alimonda 1994;
Manzetti 1993; Montenegro 1995). According to these observers, the process of
Southern Cone economic integration has been entirely the product of executive decisions,
solidified in a treaty that tends to exclude rather than promote social debate. The absence

10 Mercosur is at present a customs union, signifying a free trade area with the adoption of a common
external tariff (CET) against non-member countries. However, the member countries' ultimate aim is to
develop the agreement into a common market, which is a customs union in which all restrictions on
capital movements are abolished.
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of any significant preferential treatment for the smaller Mercosur countries, as well as any
compensatory measures for economic sectors negatively effected by the integration
process, is indicative of the exclusionary nature of the initiative. An important lacuna
within Mercosur' s founding treaty and its accompanying protocols and annexes, has been
the lack of any consideration of workers, unions, and the issue of unemployment. For
instance, the ten thematic subgroups that were specified at the historic meeting in
Asuncion, Paraguay omitted labor. An extemporaneous eleventh category concerning
labor was later created as a result of intense pressure by organized labor within the
member countries (Alimonda 1994, 26). Some of the strongest social mobilizations in the
region today are being witnessed in Brazil, the case to which we now turn.
Brazil

Brazil is an extreme case of weak party system institutionalization. Unlike other
countries in the region, where the party systems which emerged after their recent
experience of authoritarian rule largely resembled the pre-authoritarian ones, none of
Brazil's major pre-1964 parties survived (Mainwaring 1995, 369). Traditionally,
Brazilian politics has been dominated by 'catch-all' parties which seek to capture the
support of broad segments of the population through populist and clientelist tactics. In
general, party organizations in Brazil are weak, electoral volatility is high, and the
individual personalities of the candidates tend to dominate political parties and campaigns.
The lack of party sympathies among citizens, and even amongst the party leaders
themselves, has led to a situation in which parties appear and disappear with stunning
frequency (Hagopian 1996; Mainwaring 1999). As a result, there is an almost complete
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disconnect between Brazil's party system and the popular sectors. With the exception of
the Workers' Party (PT), there are no real channels for representing the interests of the
popular sectors within the Brazilian political system.
The Workers' Party is an anomaly within Brazilian political history. In the context
of an inchoate party system, the PT arose as a highly disciplined and principled party.
What is particularly noteworthy about the PT is how, from its inception, it has reached out
to social movements and sought to link them into a larger political project. Although the
party initially defined its base as the industrial working class, it had the organizational
flexibility to incorporate not only traditional social movements focused on political and
material demands, but also new ones concerned with issues of the environment, the rights
of women, and identity-based concerns (Davis 1997; Keck 1992). The decentralization
process in Brazil has been key to the success of the PT. The transfer of resources and
power to municipal-level governments has enabled the party to strengthen its
administrations and project itself as a viable, alternative political party (Nylen 2000;
Samuels 2000). Impressively, the PT' s candidate and founding member, Luis Imicio da
Silva (popularly known as 'Lula'), succeeded in winning the presidential race of2002
(www.electionworld.org).
Although the Workers' Party seeks to represent popular sector demands to the
state, not all social movements in Brazil have chosen to ally themselves with the party.
Without question, the most combative popular movement in contemporary Brazil has been
the Rural Landless Workers' Movement (MST). The MST was formed in 1984 by the
leaders of a series of land occupations that occurred almost simultaneously in several
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regions of the country during this time period. The central goals of the movement are to
secure land for landless rural workers, maintain steady pressure for agrarian reform
through large-scale land occupations, and to struggle against an economic model that is
harmful to the poor (Hammond 1999,473). Brazil has never had an agrarian reform of
any real consequence. The country' s extremely inequitable distribution ofland has
become a highly politicized issue. Over the past fifteen years, it is estimated that more
than 1,600 Brazilians have been killed over land conflicts (Cadji 2000, 30). The most
infamous massacre of landless farmers by the Brazilian military police occurred on 17
April 1996, in the state of Para. The image ofthe police opening fire on a crowd of
farmers demonstrating in support of land reform, which killed nineteen and wounded many
more, was captured on video and televised nationally (NotiSur 1112111997). The incident
served to launch the MST into the national and international spotlight.
The MST has won considerable support among the Brazilian public due to its
strategy of combining militant mobilization with a legalistic image. The movement
typically organizes the occupation of rural properties, involving anywhere from 200 to
2,500 families, and then seeks legal title under the law (Hammond 1999,473). A key
institutional support for the MST has been the Institute of Colonization and Agrarian
Reform (INCRA), which investigates all land occupations and determines whether a
property is eligible for forcible purchase under the 1964 Brazilian land law (Martins 2000).
The law clearly mandates that all land must serve a social function. Consequently, lands
lying empty and unused may be purchased by the state and then resold to the landless poor
at low interest rates and flexible payment schedules (Harbury 1999). Given that the MST
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is careful to only occupy land that appears eligible under the law, the movement usually
wins its case. It is estimated that the MST has helped more than 300,000 families gain
farmland in twenty-two of Brazil' s twenty-six states (Harbury 1999, 4).
In 1999, however, the Cardoso administration abolished the law pertaining to the
state financing ofland expropriations. In its place, a World Bank program for the nation's
first 'market agrarian reform' was introduced. Under the new program, federal funding
was shifted from INCRA to a ' land bank,' which makes loans to the rural poor for the
purchase ofland (petras 2000). With the removal of the legal backbone of the MST, the
movement has increasingly turned to the political sphere, signaling an increasing desire to
become involved in electoral politics. To date, the MST has retained a considerable
degree of autonomy in its relations with political parties, including the PT, preferring
instead to negotiate directly with the state (Fhivio de Almeida & Ruiz Sanchez 2000). The
MST is currently following a two-pronged strategy of continuing grassroots organizing in
the countryside while attempting to build an alternative political project at the national
level (petras 2000). It is questionable, however, that the MST will be able to achieve the
impressive results it did as a radical mobilizational force in its emerging new role as an
electoral movement.
The complete disconnect between the Brazilian political system and the rural
landless has resulted in a situation of radical mobilization against the country's inequitable
distribution of land. The case of Brazil ranks at the high end of the criteria for social
protest specified by this study. In terms of scope, the MST can be said to have a national
presence. Although its activities are largely focused at the local level, the MS T has
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operations in the majority of the Brazilian states and has effective social and political reach
across the country. The MST is also characterized by a high degree of intensity given its
radical tactics, particularly its reliance on extra-legal land occupations, and its militant
stance toward the state. Furthermore, while the principal concern of the MST has been
agrarian reform, its wider target is the neoliberal economic model. As an alternative to
free market capitalism and neoliberal ideology, the movement promotes the fundamental
values of solidarity, social justice, and autonomy through popular education programs in
its rural settlements (Martins 2000). Lastly, the MST also possesses a high degree of

organization. The movement engages in a lengthy process of planning within its
encampments and in preparing for the legal battle over land rights once an occupation is
completed. The pattern of social protest in Brazil can therefore be characterized as nation
wide in scope, militant, targeting the economic model, and well-organized.

Bolivia
Similar to Brazil, Bolivia also possesses a weakly institutionalized multi-party
system. Political parties in Bolivia have generally served more as vehicles for the capture
and circulation of state patronage among political elites than as organizations expressing
the interests of society (Gamarra & Malloy 1995). Historically, the nation's most
influential political party has been the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). The
MNR was founded in 1941 by the architects of post-war Bolivian politics, including
Walter Guevara Arce, Heman Siles Zuazo, and Victor Paz Estenssoro (Gamarra & Malloy
1995,401). The MNR-Ied revolution of 1952 introduced profound changes to Bolivian
society. The corporatist projects of the MNR government included the nationalization of
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tin mines, agrarian reform, and the adoption of universal suffrage. Ironically, thirty-three
years later the MNR government, under the leadership of Victor paz Estenssoro,
implemented one of the most draconian neoliberal economic programs in the history of
Latin America (Conaghan & Malloy 1994; Morales 1994).
The implementation of orthodox neoliberal economic reforms in Bolivia has had
devastating consequences for the nation' s previously most powerful social actor-organized labor. The Bolivian Workers Central (COB), in particular, has long held a
position of national political prominence as the organizational expression of Bolivia's labor
union movement. During the heyday of the revolutionary period, the MNR government
had granted co-governing status to the COB. This relationship established a system of
dual power in Bolivian society that lasted until the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s (Malloy
& Gamarra 1987). Bolivia's new economic policy, rather than being strictly economic,

also had the political aim of restoring the state's control over society. For instance, the
privatization of state-owned mining enterprises in 1985, long a bastion of support for the
COB, resulted in the loss of23,000 jobs, leaving in place a workforce of only 7,000
unionized miners (Farthing & Kohl 2001 , 9). Consequently, economic restructuring in
Bolivia has served to break the strategic position that organized labor once held over the
national economy.
The demise of organized labor in Bolivia has created a space for new social actors
to emerge. Following the growing trend in Latin America, ethnic and cultural identity in
Bolivia have become increasingly politicized in response to the homogenizing,
individuated state-society relations promoted by the neoliberal economic model. One of
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the immediate consequences of the shift toward neoliberal economic policies in Latin
America has been the weakening of state corporatist institutions (Oxhorn 1998). As part
of the corporatist project of the twentieth century, many Latin American states promoted
assimilation into the dominant mestizo culture by reconstituting indigenous peoples as
national peasants. In exchange for access to land, credit, and services, indigenous
communities were obliged to organize and define themselves as peasant communities
(Yashar 1998). As the corporate organizations of the peasantry have lost their social and
political leverage, however, the primary mode of interest intermediation between the state
and indigenous communities has been severed (Van Cott 2000). In response to this
changing economic and political context, indigenous groups in Latin America have
increasingly mobilized on the basis of indigenous identity.
Bolivia' s indigenous population, whose principal groups are the Aymara and the
Quechua, comprises a slight majority of the country's total population (Brysk & Wise
1997, 79; Yashar 1998, 25). However, the indigenous movement as a whole remains
divided over class and ethnic-based concerns. The highland indigenous movement, led by
the United Confederation of Peasant Laborers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), has generally
maintained a leftist, class-based political orientation. By contrast, the lowland indigenous
movement, headed by the Bolivian Indigenous Confederation of the Amazon (CIDOB),
has tended to emphasize ethnic-based concerns (Alb6 1996). As a result, Bolivia' s
indigenous movement remains limited in scope and fragmented in structure.
One of the most combative social actors within contemporary Bolivia are the coca
growers of the Chapare region. Since the United States' 'war on drugs' was instituted in
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1989, the coca producers have had to struggle for their livelihood against the forced
eradication programs conducted by both the Bolivian and the U.S. governments (Farthing
& Kohl 2001 , 9). Given the incompatibility of their demands with U.S. anti-narcotics
policy, the coca growers have found themselves to be in a difficult bargaining position.
However, the movement has gained greater legitimacy through its participation in
municipal government within the Chapare region (Van Cort 2000, 230). Perhaps most
impressive, the coca growers' party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), led by Evo
Morales, came within a few percentage points of winning the first round of the 2002
presidential race (www.electionworld.org). The government' s insistence that the issue of
coca eradication is non-negotiable, however, suggests that the coca growers will continue
to be a key source of social protest in Bolivia.
The new, militant anti-privatization movement has also become a surprisingly
powerful social force within Bolivia. Most notably, in the city ofCochabamba, the
privatization of the water system incited a cycle of protest activities that forced the Banzer
government to capitulate to the residents' demands. In 1999, the government sold
Cochabamba' s water system to Aguas del Tunari, a multinational consortium led by the
London-based firm International Water Limited (Shultz 2000, 44). Under the terms of its
forty-year concession, the company gained control over all of Cochabamba' s surface and
subterranean water sources. The company was also granted authority to charge for water
use in the surrounding countryside, where peasants have traditionally controlled the water
supply (Farthing & Kohl 2001 , 9). Within weeks of the privatization, water rates in
Cochabamba increased 300%. The situation was so untenable that local residents

20

participated in months-long strikes and transportation blockades that shut down the city
on three separate occasions (Shultz 2000,44). The privatization program in Cochabamba
came to symbolize all that is wrong with the neoliberal economic model and sparked
parallel protests across the country.
Public outrage against the blatantly unreasonable terms of the privatization deal in
Cochabamba quickly spread to other parts of the country. Civil society groups throughout
Bolivia began to protest not only the issue of water rights, but also the general direction of
the government's economic policies (Shultz 2000). In the highlands, indigenous and
peasant groups protesting the lack of access to land and unfavorable agricultural policies
blockaded all routes in and out of the capital city of La Paz, effectively cutting it off from
the rest of the country for a period of three weeks (Farthing & Kohl 2001). In the
Chapare region, coca growers demonstrated against the proposed construction of three
u.S.-financed military bases in the area. Following suit, the national teachers' union
declared a nation wide strike calling for wage increases (Collins 2000). Faced with a
massive civic uprising, the Banzer government terminated the contract with Aguas del
Tunari in Apri12000 (Farthing & Kohl 2001, 44). The re-nationalization of
Cochabamba's water system marked a watershed moment in the evolution of popular
protest in the country. It represented the first major victory of civil society against
unpopular neoliberal economic reforms in Bolivia.
The failure of the Bolivian party system to effectively channel the interests of the
popular sectors into the political system has produced a situation of radical mobilization
against unpopular reforms. Similar to Brazil, the case of Bolivia can be characterized as
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possessing a high level of social protest. Protest activities in Bolivia are nation wide in

scope. Through the use of parallel or solidarity protests, civil society groups are able to
effectively shut down the entire country. Secondly, such mobilizations are frequently
marked by a high degree of intensity, particularly in the case of the more militant coca
growers' unions and their violent encounters with the state. Furthermore, social protest in
Bolivia is characterized by a high degree of organization. The various social actors within
Bolivian society are not only organized at the local level, but there also appears to be an
element of coordination among social movements at the national level. Lastly, the target
of social protest in the nation is the neoliberal economic model itself Neoliberalism has
become an organizing symbol around which popular movements gather support for their
resistance efforts. The high level of social protest found in Bolivia is significant in light of
the body of literature which casts the nation as a neoliberal success case (see Haggard &
Kaufinan 1995; Morales & Sachs 1990; Pastor 1992).
Argentina
In contrast to Brazil and Bolivia, the contemporary Argentine party system is
relatively institutionalized. The country's two major political parties, the Peronist party
(Partido Justicialista) and the Radical party (Union Civica Radical), have historically had
strong roots in society. However, although party identities are strong, the parties
themselves are weak in terms of organization and ill-equipped to channel political conflict.
The Peronist party, in particular, has traditionally depicted itself more as a movement
embodying the nation as a whole, rather than as an organization competing for votes
against other legitimate contenders for power (Mainwaring & Scully 1995). Juan Peron
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himself was critical of parties and politicians and preferred to forge direct ties with his
followers rather than construct strong party organizations. As a result, Argentine society
has more often than not bypassed parties as vehicles for interest representation and relied
instead upon peak sectoral organizations, such as the National Labor Confederation
(CGT), to pressure or bargain with the executive (McGuire 1997).
The adoption of the neoliberal economic model in Argentina has had dramatic
consequences for the nation's once powerful labor movement. Significant divisions within
the movement have emerged concerning what organized labor's response should be to the
changes taking place in the labor market. The National Labor Confederation (CGT) has
long been the country's dominant peak sectoral organization representing the interests of
labor. In light of the new economic model, the CGT has largely followed a strategy of
negotiation and accommodation in exchange for political appointments and privileged
access to the executive (Murillo 1997). By contrast, the Congress of Argentine Workers
(CTA), consisting largely of public sector unions, emerged onto the labor scene in 1992 as
an independent, alternative labor confederation opposed to neoliberal economic reforms.
What sets the CTA apart from other labor confederations in Argentina is its willingness to
incorporate those sectors penalized by market reforms and marginalized by traditional
forms of interest group representation, such as the retired, the unemployed, and the selfemployed (Alimonda 1994; Patroni 2000). The CTA' s attempt to build broad-based
linkages of support across civil society has afforded the confederation a certain degree of
political import in Argentine society.
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The general trend in the decline of organized labor' s capacity to represent the
interests of Argentina' s popular sectors has coincided with the expansion of social protests
in the nation' s provinces. In particular, a new form of social protest that uses road blocks
as a means of protesting economic reforms has emerged in the provinces of Cordoba,
Catamarca, Salta, and Tucuman, where the highest levels of unemployment in the country
are found (Farinetti 1999, 28). The obstruction of national highways by the so-called
' piqueteros' has proven to be an effective means of disrupting the market and drawing
attention to the plight of the provincial communities which have suffered under the
government's economic reforms. The piqueteros typically reject the use of political
intermediaries and call on the state directly in their demands for the creation of jobs,
subsidies for the unemployed, and the deferment of tax payments for those negatively
effected by economic restructuring (Farinetti 1999). By interrupting the circulation of
labor and goods, and injecting their voices into policy debates, these protesters have
reinserted themselves into an economic and political system that has excluded them.
The origins of the piqueteros can be traced to the massive uprising in the
townships ofCutral Co and Plaza Huincul in the upper Patagonian province of Neuquen
that was caused by the privatization of the national petroleum company Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) in 1995. The privatization of the YPF resulted in massive lay
offs, with a total of 400 employees remaining out of an original workforce of 4,000
(Farinetti 1999, 28). Following the lay offs, close to 5,000 residents of the impacted
townships barricaded all routes in and out of the area for a period of six days, at which
time the local governor promised to find a solution to the unemployment problem. After
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nine months of negotiation with the government, a small subsidy was granted to 1,000
needy families in the area (Pozzi 2000). While the uprising was a local, spontaneous
reaction to a specific situation, the incident sparked a wave of similar protests throughout
Argentina that forced the De la Rua administration to begin to address those groups who
have been marginalized by market reforms.
More recently, however, social protests in Argentina have managed to temporarily
overwhelm the tenuous institutions of the state as a result of the nation's growing
economic troubles. The emerging market crisis that hit Brazil in 1998 has had serious
consequences for its Mercosur trading partners. In particular, the devaluation of the
Brazilian Real by thirty-five percent in January 1999 resulted in a surge of imports into
Argentina which, up until now, had maintained a fixed currency rate pegged to the U.S.
dollar (EID 1999, 4). Since 1991, when the Law of Convertibility was passed, Argentina
had maintained a currency board arrangement. The law required that the peso be fully
backed by foreign-currency assets in the reserves of the nation's central bank (Gajewski
2001,31; Powell 2000, 50). However, the growing global financial crisis, a strong U.S .
dollar, and the currency devaluation in Brazil has forced Argentina to undergo the painful
process of devaluation. The current political instability generated by the crisis has placed
Argentina and Mercosur at a crossroads.
The inability of Argentina's major political parties to effectively structure political
conflict and channel the demands of new social actors into the political system has
produced a moderate to high degree of social protest in the country according to the
criteria specified by this paper. Until very recently, protesters have tended to target
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specific policies, particularly individual privatization efforts, rather than the economic
model itself Similarly, the road blocks and demonstrations typically employed by the
piqueteros have generally been oriented towards negotiation rather than confrontation
with the state and have tended to be more localized in scope. Recent developments,
however, underscore the potential for popular mobilization to reach national proportions.
The massive uprising of Argentine civil society in response to the country' s recent
economic crisis reflects a high degree of intensity in terms of protest activities, such as
rioting and escalating levels of violence. However, much of the social protest currently
being witnessed in Argentina is spontaneous in nature and lacking any degree of

organization. Consequently, the pattern of social protest in Argentina can be described as
nation wide in scope, militant in intensity, targeting the political system, but spontaneous
in nature, thus falling into an intermediate category of protest.
Paraguay

The Paraguayan party system is one of the oldest and most unique systems in the
region. The country' s two major parties, the Colorado or Republican Party (Asociaci6n
Nacional Republicana) and the Liberal Party were founded in 1887 (Abente 1995, 300).
Throughout the period between the 1880s and the 1950s, Paraguay remained largely a
two-party system. However, the rough equilibrium that had been maintained between the
Colorados and the Liberals was fundamentally altered by the nation' s thirty-five years of
authoritarian rule by General Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989). By fusing the Colorado
Party, the state, and the military into a single governing framework, the Colorado Party
was propelled into the role of a hegemonic political force. During this period, access to
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bureaucratic positions, the police force, the military, and a host of other opportunities was
made contingent on being a member in good standing of the governing party. These
developments, in addition to the repression of the Liberal Party, served to strengthen the
hold of the Colorados over Paraguayan society (Abente 1995).
Paraguay has the least industrial capacity and the smallest working class of all the
Mercosur member countries. The nation' s economy depends almost exclusively on the
rural sector. In 1989, it was estimated that 96% of the country's total exports consisted
oflivestock, agriculture, and forest-related products, with an estimated 60% of the
population residing in the countryside (Carter, Barham & Mesbah 1996, 33). Historically,
a well entrenched rural oligarchy has dominated much of Paraguay's economic and
political life, benefiting from the nation' s highly inequitable distribution ofland (Richards
1997). Until recently, however, a strong peasant movement had not existed in Paraguay.
It has been suggested that the concentration of land ownership has not been an explosive

issue for the country due to the large landowners' tolerance of widespread squatting on
unused lands. However, with the move towards greater economic liberalization, and the
resultant shift in production patterns favoring large-scale agro-industry, Paraguayan
peasants have lost their access to the land (Carter, Barham & Mesbah 1996). The new
economic model, which marginalizes peasants as both small producers and workers, has
incited a cycle of land occupations followed by violent military evictions in the Paraguayan
countryside.
In the days following the coup of February 1989 which began the transition to
democracy in Paraguay, thousands of peasants illegally occupied unused lands owned by
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------ --------- - --------- ----------the state, the Stroessner family, and foreign investors. By the mid-1990s, it had been
estimated that approximately 19,000 families had laid claim to over 360,000 hectares of
land in the north eastern border region (Nagel 1999, 148). In addition to land rights, the
small farmers and rural workers have demanded direct participation in the new
government, favorable agricultural policies, and restitution for past abuses. The National
Peasant Federation (FNC) has taken a lead role in organizing this new wave of rural
activism (petras 1998). However, the dominant public discourse within Paraguayan
society has tended to vilify the rural landless as posing a threat to democracy and
economic development. Rural violence has escalated over the past decade as landowners
have employed armed guards to defend their tracts of land. In response to this growing
crisis, the Paraguayan government has frequently deployed the armed forces to quell the
occupations and to forcibly evict the rural landless (Nagel 1999, 149).
Another sector of Paraguayan society which has recently mobilized around the
issue of land is the indigenous population. Paraguay's indigenous peoples, who comprise
less than four percent of the total population, have long been disregarded by the state
(Kidd 1995, 43; Prieto 1995, 235). In an effort to make their demands known, an
important indigenous political movement named after the date of the International Day of
Indigenous Peoples recently formed in Paraguay. The Indigenous Movement of April 19
(M-19) has been active in instituting road blocks and holding protest marches. In 2000,
the M-19 decided to form its own political party and enter into the electoral arena
(AFAPP 04/23/2001 ; Gutierrez 2000; M-19 2000). Although the indigenous vote is
insignificant at the national level, in the western region known as the Chaco, indigenous
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groups comprise almost thirty percent of the total number of inhabitants (Kidd 1995, 61).
As a result, a municipal-level governing strategy is beginning to develop within the
indigenous movement. The void in popular sector interest representation within the
Paraguayan party system provides a real opportunity for a leftist party based on
indigenous, peasant, and other social movement concerns to emerge.
The domination of the Paraguayan party system by the Colorado Party has
effectively excluded certain social actors, such as landless peasants and indigenous groups,
from the polity. In response, marginalized social actors have resorted to protest activities
in an effort to try and bring about change in the desired direction. Paraguay ranks as an
intermediate case in terms of the level of social protest found in the country. Protest
activity in Paraguay tends to be local in scope, with most of the mobilization by peasant
and indigenous groups occurring in the sparsely populated north eastern border region and
the western Chaco. These movements have generally targeted large-scale, exportoriented agricultural schemes which usurp the arable land and undermine the small
farmers' subsistence base rather than the neoliberal model. Social protests, however, are
marked by a considerable degree of intensity as such groups have had to defend their land
occupations against forcible eviction by the military. At present, such mobilizations are
characterized by a moderate degree of organization. However, the indigenous movement
appears to be moving in the direction of greater organization in its role as an emerging
electoral force. The pattern of protest in Paraguay can therefore be described as local in
scope, militant, targeting specific economic policies, and somewhat organized.
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Chile
Chile has the oldest multi-party system in Latin America. The Chilean party
system, with its distinctive tripartite division of the electorate, is frequently compared to
the party systems of many European countries (Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Scully 1995).
Correspondingly, Chile is also noteworthy for its current low levels of popular protest and
mobilization. Political parties have long been considered the 'backbone' of the Chilean
political system, serving to channel and shape society' s interests. According to Scully,
"(w)hether church or union organizations, university or professional associations, large or
small groups organized at the neighborhood, municipal, or national level, parties have
been active protagonists in the long process to extend the rights of citizenship" (1995,
100). Despite seventeen years of authoritarian rule under Augusto Pinochet, the party
system that reemerged in Chile in the 1980s largely resembled the previous one. An
important distinction, however, is that the constitution put in place by Pinochet, which
greatly enhances the power of the political Right, is still in effect in Chile (Posner 1999).
This institutional impediment has limited the responsiveness of the contemporary political
system to the demands of the popular sectors.
Organized labor in contemporary Chile has proven to be an ineffectual mode of
interest representation for the popular sectors. The imposition of neoliberal economic
reforms and the political repression of organized labor during the authoritarian period have
had permanent consequences for the Chilean labor movement. The greater heterogeneity
of the Chilean workforce, low levels of unionization, and the divided political loyalties of
the workers are said to have undermined the strength of organized labor (Roberts 1997).
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There are indications, however, that Chile' s public sector unions are currently seeking to
redefine their strategic role in society. A central division within the labor movement
concerns the option of whether to work within the political system, or to seek to address
the demands of the workers through social mobilization (Munck 1994). However, it is
doubtful that a newly revamped labor movement will be able to challenge the hegemonic
hold that the neoliberal model has over Chilean society.
While much of contemporary Chilean society may have been demobilized by
political and economic reforms, the nation's indigenous peoples have increasingly shown
potential to become a radical mobilizational force. The Mapuche peoples are the largest
indigenous group in Chile, comprising approximately ten percent of the total population
(Millaman 1996). Although numerically small, the Mapuche movement has spearheaded
the resistance effort against neoliberal economic policies. According to the Chilean census
of 1992, the level of poverty among the indigenous population has reached 47.5 %, with
an illiteracy level of 19.4% (PuntoFinal2001 , 1). The Mapuche nation argues that the
government's economic reforms have been particularly devastating to the country' s
indigenous peoples. Specifically, activist groups cite the construction of hydroelectric
dams and extensive logging on Mapuche lands, along with the expropriation of their
ancestral territories, as their central grievances (NotiSur 03/06/1998). The protest
marches, demonstrations, and attempts at land occupations by the Mapuche movement
have been met with serious repression by the state in the form of police beatings and
arrests (Buendia 2000).
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The Mapuche movement has remained splintered by partisan rivalries and clashes
among competing factions over the question of tactics. Recently, the Council of All
Lands, a Mapuche nationalist organization, has emerged as a radical alternative. The
Council is well known within Chilean society for its high-profile militancy in the form of
illegal land occupations (NotiSur 07/21/1992). In February 1998, a Chilean judge ordered
more than 400 Mapuche peoples be forcibly removed from the Fundo EI Rincon property
owned by Forestal Mininco. The occupation, which was organized by the Council of All
Lands, was based on a Mapuche land claim. The dispute is one of fifty-five pending cases
between the Mapuche movement and Chilean forestry companies (NotiSur 03/06/1998).
Despite the growing power of the Council, the majority of the indigenous peoples do not
support their 'sensationalist' actions. Factions within the movement which have chosen to
work within the existing party system channels have accused the Council of acting
irresponsibly and playing into the hands of the Chilean Right (NotiSur 11/13/1991). It
remains to be seen whether the movement will be capable of presenting a unified front in
its demands against the state.
Chile's well-institutionalized party system has served to channel much of society's
demands into the political system, thereby dampening political conflict. With the sole
exception of the indigenous movement, which has been marginalized by the political
system, social mobilization in Chile is minimal. The scope of the Mapuche movement,
however, is local as opposed to nation wide. Most of the movement's protest activities
tend to be contained within the center-south region of Chile known as 'Araucania'
(Millaman 1996, 30). However, the movement is characterized by a high degree of
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intensity given its violent clashes with Chilean authorities over its attempts at land
occupation. In terms of the degree of organization, the Mapuche peoples remain divided
by partisan loyalties and ideological differences. Furthermore, most of the movement's
protest activities have targeted specific export-oriented economic policies which impinge
upon their ancestral territories, rather than the neoliberal model itself Consequently,
while social protest in Chile is low overall, it has the potential to become radicalized
depending on the direction of development of the indigenous movement.
Uruguay
Unlike the other Mercosur countries, the unusual degree of party system
institutionalization that is found in Uruguay has mitigated against social mobilization by
funneling the debate over economic reform into the nation's political system. Uruguay has
one of the oldest party systems in Latin America. At the core of the nation's political
system has been the Colorado Party and the National Party (also known as the Blancos),
whose origins date back almost 150 years (Gonzalez 1995, 140). Each party has generally
had the support of about half the country, with the Colorados representing the more
cosmopolitan, urban sectors of society and the Blancos being more rural and conservative
in nature. Before the country's recent authoritarian experience, Uruguay was perhaps the
most stable democracy in the region and was frequently touted as the' Switzerland of
Latin America' for its welfare state leanings (Gonzalez 1995). Consequently, of all the
parties to the Mercosur agreement, Uruguay stands to be the most affected by the
integration process.
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There has been a marked decline of the welfare state in Uruguay as a result of the
general trend toward greater economic liberalization. However, these transformations
have been gradual and the overall deterioration in the quality oflife has tended to follow a
relatively egalitarian pattern across Uruguayan society (Filgueira & Papadopulos 1997).
Furthermore, any serious attempts to introduce wide-scale economic reforms have been
successfully defeated as a result of a peculiar feature of the Uruguayan political party
system. Namely, the ability to call for a referendum on major policy issues has enabled the
popular sectors to effectively veto stabilization and adjustment measures. For instance,
since the return to democracy in 1985, six major attempts have been made to reform the
nation' s much lauded social security system, all six of which were defeated by popular
plebiscites (Filgueira & Papadopulos 1997, 363). In general, the stronger and more
diverse institutional channels for registering discontent on the part of Uruguay' s popular
sectors has tended to dampen social protests and temper the severity of neoliberal reforms
in the country.
Equally important, the popular sectors have found an institutional ally in the form
of the political Left. The Uruguayan Left, which resurfaced in 1985 with the Broad Front
(FA), has become the chief defender of the nation' s welfare state legacy. The FA is an
alliance of eighteen parties that runs the entire leftist gamut. The coalition party has
benefited electorally by the failure of the Blancos and Colorados to resolve the country's
growing economic and social problems (Winn & Ferro-Clerico 1997). The FA' s main
candidate, Tabare Vazquez, won the 1990 mayoral race in Montevideo. The main
political project of the FA has been to make government more responsive by
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decentralizing power and resources to the local level. The party's strategy is to use a
successful experience in municipal government as a launching pad to the presidency (Winn
1995). As the country' s leading opposition party, the FA promises to be a key source of
institutional support for Uruguay' s popular sectors during the integration process.
The case of Uruguay illustrates the central argument of this paper of how a wellinstitutionalized party system can funnel social unrest into a nation's political system,
thereby dampening political conflict. As a result of the specific features of Uruguay' s
political party system and the electoral strength of the Left, social protest in the nation is
minimal. The solid institutional channels which are available to express the grievances of
civil society concerning the process of economic reform and integration have tended to
absorb social unrest. In particular, the plebiscite mechanism within the political party
system has given the nation' s citizens considerable influence over the scope and pace of
reform. Uruguay exemplifies the dynamics of social protest, or lack thereof, that occurs
within a well-institutionalized party system.
Conclusion

The central task of this paper has been to explain why social protests against
neoliberal reforms have occurred more in some countries than in others. I have argued
that the degree of party system institutionalization within a country conditions the nature,
scope, and intensity of resistance to market reform on the part of civil society. Countries
with more institutionalized party systems tend to experience a lesser degree of social
protest as popular sector demands are effectively channeled into the political system. The
social protests which do occur within these systems tend to be spontaneous, localized, and
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focused on specific policies. Conversely, countries with weakly institutionalized party
systems tend to experience a higher degree of social protest. Protests within these systems
have a tendency to become radicalized and to overwhelm the weak institutions of the
state. However, such protests also tend to be better organized, take on national
dimensions, and target the economic model itself. Consequently, this paper suggests that
the character of domestic political institutions plays an important role in shaping the
response of civil society to neoliberal economic reforms.
Secondly, this paper has attempted to determine whether there are discernible
patterns in the forms of social protest being undertaken in contemporary Latin America.
I have argued that the move to neoliberal economic policies has produced a shift in the
pattern of social protest, from institutionalized to non-institutionalized forms of social
mobilization. In general, workers have been the main bearers of the costs of economic
restructuring. As a result, labor unions have lost much of their socio-economic weight
and political influence. While public sector unions have remained active in the region, they
have tended to mobilize in an effort to simply maintain minimal rights for workers (Munck
1994). Consequently, organized labor appears incapable of offering any credible policy
alternatives. The decline of traditional, class-based collective action has left a void that is
being filled by new social actors, employing unprecedented forms of collective action.
The new pattern of social protest involves different social actors, such as the
unemployed, the landless, and indigenous groups, who until recently had not expressed
themselves publicly nor collectively. This form of social protest is also different in terms
of its demands, which tend to be local, defensive, civic, and identity-based as opposed to

36

class-based in nature. Lastly, the new pattern of social protest tends to be based on
innovative fonns of collective action, such as the use of road blocks and holding parallel
protest activities. However, this fonn of social protest possesses a number oflimitations.
In particular, whereas organized labor in the past was able to negotiate from a position of
strength and present its demands as a unified block, the demands of the new social actors
are susceptible to being played off of one another by their respective governments. The
diversity of interests at stake in these new protest movements suggests that the movement
leaders will need to recognize that they share overarching concerns in their struggles if
they are to be effective over the long run.
The institutionalist perspective on which this study is based is not without its
limitations. Institutions are a necessary, not a sufficient factor in explaining diverse
outcomes. However, institutions do create the parameters within which actors establish
their behavior and as such tend to have predictable consequences. The benefit of an
institutionalist approach is that it provides an effective basis for making cross-case
comparisons and possesses a measure of theoretical generalizability. Therefore, it is
hoped that the central insights of this paper on the patterns of social protest in
contemporary Latin America will have wider applicability to the study of the political
impacts of the neoliberal economic model in developing nations as well as open new
avenues for research.
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Appendix A: Country Sample
Each country enters into the data set starting from the year of its transition to
democracy. The cases of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, which transitioned to
democracy in the mid-twentieth century, were entered into the data set beginning in 1978,
the beginning of the third wave of democracy and the shift toward neoliberal economic
policies. Data on political regime change dates were taken from The Statistical Abstract

of Latin America, 2002, Vol. 38, Table 1002.
The countries and years they entered into the data set were as follows : Argentina
1983; Bolivia 1982; Brazil 1985; Chile 1990; Colombia 1978; Costa Rica 1978;
Dominican Republic 1978; Ecuador 1979; EI Salvador 1992; Guatemala 1986; Honduras
1982; Mexico 1988; Nicaragua 1990; Panama 1989; Paraguay 1989; Peru 1980; Uruguay
1985; Venezuela 1978.
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Appendix B: Measurement of Variables
Electoral Volatility
Electoral volatility is calculated according to the Pedersen index (1983). The index
provides a measure of the net aggregate vote/seat shifts from one election to the next. It
is calculated as the sum of individual party gains and losses divided by two . The index
yields a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 signifying that no parties lost or gained vote/seat
percentages and a score of 100 meaning that all votes/seats went to a new set of parties.
For the purpose of this study, the electoral volatility scores of presidential and legislative
elections were averaged to produce one general score.
Fragmentation
Following Roberts and Wibbels (1999), party system fragmentation is calculated by the
percentage of the vote/seats obtained by the top two parties in the previous election
subtracted from 100. Higher scores are associated with greater fragmentation. The
fragmentation scores used in this study are the average of the presidential and legislative
election scores.
Polarization
Ideological polarization is calculated on the basis of the continuous indicator developed by
Coppedge (1997) to measure Left-Right polarization. The mean left-right position of the
party system is calculated by subtracting weighted left-of-center scores from weighted
right-of-center scores. An index of polarization is calculated by measuring the dispersion
from this mean in individual elections based on the share of the vote and the ideological
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position of the individual parties. The polarization scores used in this study are based on
legislative elections.
Party Age

Following Roberts and Wibbels (1999), the party age variable is calculated by the average
age of the political parties that received more than 10% of the vote/seats in the previous
election. The party ages used in this study are based on the average of the ages of the
parties in presidential and legislative elections.
Income Inequality

The income inequality variable is based on the Gini coefficient for urban household income
in Latin America for selected years, 1978-1998. Gini coefficients range from a value of 0
to 1, with higher values signifying greater inequality. The data is derived from The

Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 2002, Vol. 38, Table 1411 . This data source
provides coefficients for all Latin American countries, except Peru, at approximately twoyear intervals. The Gini coefficient of family income inequality in Peru was drawn from
the World FactBook 2002; http://www.cia.gov.cialpublications/factbook/fieldsl2172.html.
Land Inequality

The land inequality variable is based on the Gini coefficient for land concentration in Latin
America for selected years, 1960-1993. The data is derived from The Statistical Abstract

of Latin America, 2002, Vol. 38, Table 205. This data source provides coefficients for all
Latin American countries, except Mexico and Nicaragua, with one coefficient listed for
the decades of 1970, 1980, and 1990. The Gini coefficients for land inequality in Mexico
and Nicaragua were derived from the calculations by Muller and Seligson (1987).

40

References
Abente, Diego. 1995. "A Party System in Transition: The Case of Paraguay," in
Mainwaring, S. and T.R Scully (eds.). Building Democratic Institutions: Party
Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 298-322.
AFAPP. 200l. "19 de Abril, Rebeldia Indigena." http: www.mail-archive.comlafapp.html.
Alb6, Xavier. 1996. "Bolivia: Making the Leap from Local Mobilization to National
Politics," NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 29, pp. 15-20.
Alimonda, Hector. 1994. "Mercosur, Democracy, and Labor," Latin American
Perspectives, Vol. 21, No.4, pp. 21-33 .
Bafio, Rodrigo. 1993. "Socioeconomic Structure and Collective Behavior," CEPAL
Review 50, pp. 181-199.
Buendia, Mauricio. 2000. "Guerra Sucia en el Sur," PuntoFinal, No. 460,6 pgs.
Cadji, Anne-Laure. 2000. "Brazil's Landless Find their Voice," NACLA Report on the
Americas, Vol. 33, No.5, pp. 30-35.
Carter, Michael; Bradford L. Barham; and Dina Mesbah. 1996. "Agricultural Export
Booms and the Rural Poor in Chile, Guatemala, and Paraguay," Latin American
Research Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 33-65 .
Collins, Jennifer. 2000. "Gains for Campesinos, Stalemate for Cocaleros in Bolivia,"
NACLA Report on the Americas. Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 1-2.
Conaghan, Catherine M. and James M. Malloy. 1994. Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy
and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press.
Coppedge, Michael. 1997. DynamiC Diversity of Latin American Party Systems. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame, Kellogg Institute for International Studies,
Working Paper Series.
Davis, Diane E. 1997. "New Social Movements, Old Party Structure: Discursive and
Organizational Transformations in Mexican and Brazilian Party Politics," in Smith,
W.C. and RP. Korzeniewicz (eds.). Politics, Social Change, and Economic
Restructuring in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 152-186.
Eckstein, Harry. 1980. "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political
Violence," in Gurr, T.R (ed.). Handbook of Political Conflict. New York: Free
Press, pp. 135-166.

41

EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit). 1999. Brazil Revisited: Reassessing Risks and
Business Strategies. New York: EIU Publications.
Farinetti, Marina. 1999. "Que Queda del 'Movimiento Obrero'? Las Formas del Rec1amo
Laboral en la Nueva Democracia Argentina," Trabajo y Sociedad, Vol. 1, No.1 ,
pp. 1-44.
Farthing, Linda and Ben Kohl. 2001. "Bolivia' s New Wave of Protest," NACLA Report on
the Americas. Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 8-1 1.
Filgueira, Fernando and Jorge Papadopulos. 1997. "Putting Conservatism to Good Use?
Long Crisis and Vetoed Alternative in Uruguay," in Chalmers, Douglas A. et al.
(eds.). The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation
and Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 360-387.
Flavio de Almeida, Lucio and Felix Ruiz Sanchez. 2000. "The Landless Workers'
Movement and Social Struggles Against Neoliberalism," Latin American
Perspectives, Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 11-32.
Gajewski, Joanna. 2001. "The Greenback Effect," World Link, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 28-33 .
Garnarra, Eduardo A. and James M. Malloy. 1995. ' The Patrimonial Dynamics of Party
Politics in Bolivia." in Mainwaring, S. and T.R. Scully (eds.). BUilding Democratic
Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
pp. 399-433 .
Gonzalez, Luis E. 1995. "Continuity and Change in the Uruguayan Party System," in
Mainwaring, S. and T.R. Scully (eds.). Building Democratic Institutions: Party
Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.138-163.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gutierrez, Andres Colman. 2000. "Camino hacia la Autodeterrninacion: Movimiento
Indigena 19 de Abril," Revista Accion (paraguay), No. 209;
http://www.uninet.com.py/acccionl209/indigena.html.
Haggard, Stephen and Robert R. Kaufinan. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hagopian, Frances. 1996. Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hammond, John L. 1999. "Law and Disorder: The Brazilian Landless Farmworkers'
Movement," Bulletin ofLatin American Research, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 469-489.

42

Harbury, Jennifer. 1999. "World Bank Takes Aim at Brazil's Landless Movement,"
NACLA Report on the Americas. Vol. 33, No.2, p.4.
Keck, Margaret Elizabeth. 1992. The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kidd, Stephen W. 1995. "Land, Politics, and Benevolent Shamanism: The Enxet Indians in
a Democratic Paraguay," Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp.
43-75 .
Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of
Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott. 1995. "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in Mainwaring, S.
and T.R. Scully (eds.). Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin
America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.354-398.
Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. "Introduction: Party Systems in Latin
America," in Mainwaring, S. and T.R. Scully (eds.). Building Democratic
Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
pp.1-36
Malloy, James M. and Eduardo Gamarra. 1987. "The Transition to Democracy in
Bolivia," in Malloy, lM. and M.A. Seligson (eds.). Authoritarians and
Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, pp. 93-119.
Manzetti, Luigi. 1993. "The Political Economy of Merco sur," Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 101-141.
March, James and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational
Basis of Politics. New York: The Free Press.
Martins, Monica Dias. 2000. "The MST Challenge to Neoliberalism," Latin American
Perspectives, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 33-45.
McGuire, James W. 1997. Peronism without Peron: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in
Argentina. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Millaman, Rosamel. 1996. "Chile's Mapuche Organize Against NAFTA," NACLA Report
on the Americas. Vol. 29, pp. 30-31.
Montenegro, Marcelo. 1995. "Labor and Mercosur," NACLA Report on the Americas.
Vol. 28, pp. 32-33.

43

Morales, Juan Antonio. 1994. "Democracy, Economic Liberalism, and Structural Reform
in Bolivia." in Smith, W.C. et al. (eds.). Democracy, Markets, and Structural
Reform in Latin America. Miami: North-South Center, pp. 129-148.
Morales, Juan Antonio and Jeffrey D . Sachs. 1990. "Bolivia' s Economic Crisis," in Sachs,
J. D. (ed.). Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance: Country
Studies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 159-268.
Movimiento Indigena 19 de Abril (M-19). "Para la Vida ... Tierra y Poder Indigena; Acto
de Lanzamiento," Chaco, Paraguay, promotional brochure.
Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency,"
American Political Science Review. Vol. 82, No. 2, pp. 425-452.
Munck, Ronaldo. 1994. "Workers, Structural Adjustment, and Concertaci6n Social in
Latin America," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 21 , No. 3, pp. 90-103 .
Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001 . Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms
in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murillo, Maria Victoria. 1997. "Union Politics, Market-Oriented Reforms and the
Reshaping of Argentine Corporatism," in Chalmers, Douglas et al. (eds.). The New
Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and
Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72-94.
Nagel, Beverly Y. 1999. "'Unleashing the Fury' : The Cultural Discourse of Rural
Violence and Land Rights in Paraguay," Comparative Studies in Society and
History, Vol. 41 , No. 1, pp. 148-181.
NotiSur. 03/0611998. "Chile: Indian Groups Fight Growing Debt." 3 pgs.
NotiSur. 1112111997. "Brazil: Military Accused of Massacre of Landless Campesinos will
Face Trial." 1 pg.
NotiSur. 07/2111992. "Chile: Mapuche Indigenous Organizations Struggle to Obtain
Legalization of Ancestral Lands." 2 pgs.
NotiSur. 1111311991. "Chile: Summary ofMapuche Land Occupations." 2 pgs.
Nylen, William R. 2000. "The Making of a Loyal Opposition: The Workers' Party (PT)
and the Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil," in Kingstone, Peter R. and T.J.
Power (eds.). Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 126-143 .

44

Oxhorn, Philip. 1998. "Is the Century of Corporatism Over? Neoliberalism and the Rise of
Neopluralism." in Oxhorn, P. and G. Ducatenzeiler (eds.). What Kind of
Democracy? What Kind ofMarket? Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 195-217.
Oxhorn, Philip and Graciela Ducatenzeiler. 1999. "The Problematic Relationship between
Economic and Political Liberalization: Some Theoretical Considerations," in
Oxhorn, P. and P.K. Starr (eds.). Markets and Democracy in Latin America:
Conflict or Convergence? Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 13-42.
Pastor, Manuel Jr. 1992. Inflation, Stabilization, and Debt: Macroeconomic Experiments
in Peru and Bolivia. Boulder: Westview Press.
Patroni, Viviana. 2000. "Democracy and Organized Labor in Argentina: Challenges and
New Alternatives," in Kleinberg, Remonda Bensabat and Janine A. Clark (eds.).
Economic Liberalization, Democratization, and Civil Society in the Developing
World. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 241-262.
Pedersen, Mogens. 1983 . "Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party
Systems, 1948-1977," in Daalder, Hans and Peter Mair (eds.). Western European
Party Systems: Continuity and Change . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 29-66.
Pereira, Lia Valls. 1999. "Toward the Common Market of the South: Mercosur's Origins,
Evolution and Challenges," in Roett, R. (ed.). Mercosur: Regional Integration,
WorldMarkets. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 7-23 .
Petras, James. 2000. "The Movement Gains Momentum." Movimento dos Trabalhadores
Rurais sem Terra, http://www.mstbrazil.org/petras0300.html, 8 pgs.
Petras, James. 1998. "The New Revolutionary Peasantry: The Growth of Peasant-Led
Opposition to Neoliberalism," http://www.mstbrazil.org/petras1098.html, 8 pgs.
Posner, Paul W. 1999. "Popular Participation and Political Dissatisfaction in Chile' s New
Democracy," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 41 , No.1 ,
pp. 59-85 .
Powell, Andrew. 2000. "It's Currency that Counts," LatinFinance, No. 118, pp. 50-52.
Pozzi, Pablo. 2000. "Popular Upheaval and Capitalist Transformation in Argentina," Latin
American Perspectives. Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 63-87.
Prieto, Esther. 1995. "Indigenous Peoples in Paraguay," in Van Cott, Donna Lee (ed.).
Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America. New York: St. Martin's
Press, pp. 235-258.

45

PuntoFinal. 2001. "Municipios en Manos Mapuche," Vol. 35, No. 487;
http://www.puntofinal.cl/olO105/nactxt.html. 6 pgs.
Richards, Donald G. 1997. "Dependent Development and Regional Integration: A Critical
Examination of the Southern Cone Common Market," Latin American
Perspectives, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 133-155.
Roberts, Kenneth M . 1997. "Rethinking Economic Alternatives: Left Parties and the
Articulation of Popular Demands in Chile and Peru," in Chalmers, Douglas A. et
al. (eds.). The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking
Participation and Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 170-191.
Roberts, Kenneth M. 1996. "Economic Crisis and the Demise of the Legal Left in Peru,"
Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 69-92.
Roberts, Kenneth M. and Erik Wibbels. 1999. "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in
Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No.3, pp. 575-590.
Rothstein, Bo. 1996. "Political Institutions: An Overview," in Goodin, RE. and HD.
Klingemann (eds.). A New Handbook of Political Science . Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 133-166
Scully, Timothy R. 1995. "Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile," in Mainwaring, S. and
T.R. Scully (eds.). Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin
America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 100-137.
Shultz, Jim. 2000. "Bolivians Win Anti-Privatization Battle." NACLA Report on the
Americas. Vol. 33, No. 6, pp. 44-46.
Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2000. The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of
Diversity in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Winn, Peter. 1995. "Frente Amplio in Montevideo," NACLA Report on the Americas.
Vol. 29, pp. 20-26.
Winn, Peter and Lilia Ferro-Clerico. 1997. "Can a Leftist Government Make a Difference?
The Frente Amplio Administration of Montevideo, 1990-1994," in Chalmers,
Douglas A. et al. (eds.). The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America:
Rethinking Participation and Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 447-468.
Yashar, Deborah J. 1998. "Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and
Democracy in Latin America," Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No.1, pp. 23-42.

46

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

LATIN AMERICAN AND IBERIAN INSTITUTE
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
1.

Guess, George M. "Bureaucracy and the Unmanaged Forest Commons in
Costa Rica." December 1979.

2.

Lupsha, Peter A., and Kip Schlegel. "The Political Economy of Drug
Trafficking: The Herrera Organization (Mexico and the United States)."
November 1980.

3.

Gregory, Peter. "Employment, Unemployment, and Underemployment in
Latin America." March 1981.

4.

Levy, James, and Nick Mills, Jr. "The Challenge to Democratic Reformism
in Ecuador." June 1981.

5.

Gregory, Peter. "Legal Minimum Wages as an Instrument of Social Policy in
Less Developed Countries, with Special Reference to Costa Rica." July
1981.

6.

Dfez-Canedo, Juan. "Undocumented Migration to the United States: A New
Perspective." August 1981.

7.

Sabloff, Paula L. W . "Caciquismo in Post-Revolutionary Mexican EjidoGrant Communities." September 1981.

8.

Gregory, Peter. "Economic Development and the Labor Market in Mexico."
November 1981.

9.

Earley, Stephen. "Arms and Politics in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 19481981." May 1982.

10.

Wessman, James W. "Peasants, Capitalists, and the State: Mexico's
Changing Agricultural Policies and the 'Hungarian Project'." May 1982.

11.

Conniff, Michael L. "Black Labor on a White Canal: West Indians in
Panama, 1904-1980." May 1983.

12.

Froehlich, Jeffery W., and Karl H. Schwerin. "Conservation and Indigenous
Human Land Use in the Rfo Pllitano Watershed, Northeast Honduras." June
1983.

13.

Bales, Fred V. "Comparing Media Use and Political Orientation Among
Squatter Settlers of Two Latin American Countries." June 1983.

14.

Sabloff, Jeremy A., Patricia A. McAnany, Bernd Fahmel Beyer, T6mas
Gallareta N., Signa L. Larralde, and LuAnn Wandsnider. "Ancient Maya
Settlement Patterns at the Site of Sayil, Puuc Region, Yucatan, Mexico:
Initial Reconnaissance (1983)." January 1984.

15.

Santley, Robert S., Ponciano Ortiz Ceballos, Thomas W. Killion, Philip J.
Arnold, and Janet M. Kerley. "Final Field Report of the Matacapan
Archaeological Project: The 1982 Season." June 1984.

16.

Morris, Nancy E. "Canto porque es necesario cantar: The New Song
Movement in Chile, 1973-1983." July 1984.

17.

Sabloff, Jeremy A., Gair Tourtellot, Bernd Fahmel Beyer, Patricia A.
McAnany, Diana Christensen, Sylviane Boucher, and Thomas R. Killion.
"Settlem~nt and Community Patterns at Sayil, Yucatan, Mexico: The 1984
Season." April 1985.

18.

Brajer, Victor. "An Analysis of Inflation in the Small, Open Economy of
Costa Rica." June 1986.

19.

Ashley, John M. "The Social and Environmental Effects of the Palm-Oil
Industry in the Oriente of Ecuador." October 1987.

20.

Hidalgo, Margarita. "Perceptions of Spanish-English Code-Switching in
Juarez, Mexico." March 1988.

21.

Arnold, Philip J III. "Ceramic Production and Consumption in the Sierra de
los Tuxtlas, Veracruz, Mexico." June 1988.

22.

Gregory, Peter. "Undocumented Migration to the United States: Can the
Flow Be Stemmed?" May 1989.

23.

White, Thomas U. "Mexican Immigrant Labor: An Alternative Analysis and
Policy Proposal." November 1989.

24.

Lipski, John M . "On the Non-Creole Basis for Afro-Caribbean Spanish."
February 1993 .

25.

Lamadrid, Enrique R. "Treasures of the Mama Huaca: Oral Tradition and
Ecological Consciousness in Chinchaysuyu." May 1993.

26.

Lipski, John M. "New Perspective on Afro-Dominican Spanish: the Haitian
Contribution." May 1994.

27.

Tarver, Gina McDaniel. "Issues of Otherness and Identity in the works of
Izquierdo, Kahlo, Artaud, and Breton." April 1996.

28.

Craib, Raymond B., III. "Chinese Immigrants in Porfirian Mexico: A
Preliminary Study of Settlement, Economic Activity and Anti-Chinese
Sentiment." May 1996.

29.

Bannister, Geoffrey J. "The Economic Context of the Mexican Crisis."
September 1996.

30.

Elinore M. Barrett. "The Geography of Rio Grande Pueblos Revealed by
Spanish Explorers, 1540-1598." May 1997.

31.

Charles Clark. "The Delegitimation of Land Tenure in Tropical Peten,
Guatemala." May 1998.

32.

Chad T. Black. "The Making of an Indigenous Movement: Culture,
Ethnicity, and Post-Marxist Social Praxis in Ecuador." May 1999.

33 .

Alyssa Cymene Howe. "Re-Engendering Revolution: Nicaraguan Gay and
Lesbian Rights and the Sex of Post-Sandinismo." May 1999.

34.

Feliza Medrano. "'Ni chicha ni limonada': Depictions of the Mulatto Woman
in Cuban Tobacco Art." May 1999.

35.

Karen Stocker. "No somos nada: Ethnicity and Three Dominant and
Contradictory Indigenist Discourses in Costa Rica." June 2000.

36.

Teresa Eckmann. "Chicano Artists and Neo-Mexicanists: (De) Constructions
of National Identity. July 2000.

37.

Rachel Elaine Archer. "Society, Culture, and Heroes: Depictions of Cuban
Heroine Mariana Grajales Cuello, 1893-2000." July 2001

38.

Nancy J. Burke. "Pre-Paid Phone Cards, Casas, and Photos of the Saintsf:
Transnational Santeria Practices in a Southwest City." July 2002

39.

Robert Fiala and Susan Tiano. "Maquila Employment and Fertility in
Mexicali, Mexico: A Study of the Dynamics of Productive and Reproductive
Relations." June 2003

40.

Roberta Rice. "Channeling Discontent: The Impact of Political Institutions
on Patterns of Social Protest in Contemporary Latin America." June 2003
NAFT AlMERCOSUR WORKING PAPER SERIES

1.

Alejandro Frigerio. "La expansion de religiones afro-brasilefias en el Cono
Sur: Representaciones conflictivas de cultura, raza y nacion en un contexto
de integracion regional." July 2000.

2.

B. Paglieri and P. Sanguinetti. "Institutional Issues and the Results of the
Tariff and Non-Tariff Liberalization in Mercosur." July 2000.

3.

Randall R. Parish, Jr. "Stability without Hegemony: Brazil, Argentina, and
Southern Cone Integration." July 2000

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
1.

Remmer, Karen L. "The Chilean Military under Authoritation Rule, 19731987." March 1988.

2.

Davidson, Russ "A Description of Rare and Important Medina Imprints in
the University of New Mexico Library." May 1988.

3.

Martz, John D. "The Military in Ecuador: Policies and Politics of
Authoritarian Rule." June 1988.

4.

Torres, Victor F. "The Canudos War Collection." May 1990.

5.

Claire-Lise Benaud and Oscar E. Delepiani. "OAXACA: A Critical
Bibliography of Rare and Specialized Materials in the University of New
Mexico's General Library." March 1992.

SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS
1.

Davidson, Russ and Joiner, Carol. "Mexico in the UNM Libraries: A Guide
To Special Materials and Older Works." Spring 1986.

2.

Kjeldgaard, Linda, editor. "Encuentro: A Columbian Quincentenary
Quarterly" . 1985 - 1989.

3.

Kjeldgaard, Linda, editor. "Encounters: A Quincentenary Review. 1989-.

4.

Landmann, Robert S., editor. "The Problem of the Undocumented Worker."
Spring 1980.

All research and occasional papers and special publications are available from the Latin
American and Iberian Institute; 1 University of New Mexico; MSC02 1690,801 Yale NE,
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131; 505-277-2961. Call for prices. To comply with the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, these publications are also available in
alternative formats.

